How to Create a SQL Server Database

Erdogan's visit to India likely to provide fresh fillip to India-Turkey relations in a changing                                           world

India and Turkey waited fourteen years to see this moment once again. It's former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who should be credited for redefining India-Turkey relations, now waiting for a breakthrough to qualify for another qualitative step forward. In 2001, deputy prime minister LK Advani was the first high-level dignitary of the NDA government to have visited Turkey which concluded with an important agreement on an extradition treaty. Later, in 2003, prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had gone on his landmark visit to Turkey - no Indian prime minister since then had gone to Turkey until prime minister Narendra Modi, in 2015, went to Antalaya to meet the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the margins of the G20 summit which was followed by another meeting on the sidelines of G20 Summit in Hangzhou, China in 2016.
There are many good reasons to believe that the leaders of the two nations will find Vajpayee's legacy as a common point to advance India-Turkey relations. The regional contexts in which the two countries are working support their role as well. Turkey, for example, notwithstanding setbacks in Syria, remains an influential and a key regional power to define the future outcomes of crisis in Syria and Iraq. Once a reluctant Muslim partner, Turkey has become a close ally of the Gulf countries, thanks to Iran's growing hegemonic ambitions. Egypt's preoccupation with its domestic crisis and absence of American leadership from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security architecture. Turkey's normalised relations with Israel and Russia has a stabilising role in the region - where it can assume a balancing role among various competitive powers. Iran's regional role has become deeply dependent on its military cooperation with Russia and other non-state actors like Hezbollah - something that Iran's Arab neighbours are extremely worried about. Despite many serious differences over Syria, Turkey remains in good terms with Iran, however, allowing Turkey to use its leverage to mediate between Iran and its Gulf neighbours.
On Syria, Russia needs Turkey more than any other country to find a lasting political settlement; Russia has been advocating for a political outcome. Since the fall of Aleppo, Turkey has also refocused its Syria policy from regime change to counter terrorism, narrowing its differences with Russia and Iran. Turkey's counter terrorism response is defined by three major threats: 1) Islamic State's presence in many urban areas of Syria and Iraq 2) expansion of Kurdish separatist forces closely linked with internationally recognised terrorist group PKK 3) Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist groups active in Syria and Iraq.
In an extremely complicated Syrian crisis, the Assad government has successfully used these threats tactically against the Syrian rebels, by softening its view on Syrian Kurdish groups and using "Islamic terrorism” card interchangeably with Islamic State, the opposition forces and Al-Qaeda groups. As terrorist attacks increased against Turkish targets in 2015 and 2016, Turkey's frustration against its Western allies' support to the Kurdish groups deepened. In 2016, Turkey adopted a go-alone military operation against Islamic State in north Syria starting from Jerablus and stopping at Al-Bab, effectively converting Euphrates as a buffer zone between the two sides of Kurds-held areas. However, the 15 July failed military coup attempt caught Turkey unaware of another terror threat, the Gulen network many Turks perceived only as a "spiritual cult”.
Turkey's relations with its Western allies have gone berserk on Western indifference to what Turkey considers most serious threat to its national security. European leaders have been delaying Turkey's EU accession. In the wake of the Turkish referendum for constitutional amendments, some Turkish politicians were denied attendance to political events in some European cities. The trust deficit between Turkey and the West is widening. In this context, Turkey's relation with Russia, China and India is qualitatively improving Turkey's earlier 'West-centric' foreign policy towards a 'multidimensional foreign policy'.
Turkey's South Asia engagement is likely to deepen after India has renewed its interest in the Southern Corridor of Asia-Europe Rail (SCAER) project which will connect Istanbul with Kolkata, extendable further to Myanmar and Thailand. Officials from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia and Turkey have already concluded their first meeting in New Delhi on 16 March, 2017. Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) was originally proposed by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) in 1980s and endorsed by concerned countries in 1992. The rail link, if started, can revolutionise India's trade connectivity to Central Asia, Europe and West Asia.
Trade and regional cooperation potentials notwithstanding, India and Turkey have some problems that keep overwhelming the perception of their bilateral relations. Three issues will always be asked when it comes to deepen India-Turkey relations. First, how much Pakistan determines Turkey's India perception, second, Turkey's perception of Kashmir, and third, what is Turkey's view of reforms in international institutions, which should ideally result in including India in the United Nations Security Council as permanent member.
It is true that Pakistan-Turkey relations are more emotional than Turkey-India relations. Pakistan is projected as a country of Islamic leadership despite the fact that India remains the second largest Muslim country in the world, without OIC membership though. The question many Muslim countries do not ask is: who is more important Pakistan or Kashmir, Pakistan or Indian Muslims? (on whose behalf, Pakistan often tries to claim leadership)
Pakistan's 'pro-Muslim' and 'pro-Kashmir' credentials are often received uncritically. Turkey's strong secular and democratic credentials bring great respect and regard for Turkey in India in stark opposition to the fragility of Pakistan's democracy. It is not surprising to observe that Turkish media has been mostly fair and objective in its coverage of India-Pakistan affairs, rather, many Turks have a clear understanding that Turkey should not come into Pakistan's trap of internationalising the Kashmir issue. Erdogan's visit should start a new era of bilateral engagement where both sides should invest efforts to understand each other.
India's Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership is likely to be discussed by the two leaders. India's NSG membership has been delayed without recognising India's own merits. If Erdogan and Modi come to an understanding on India's NSG bid, this can expedite India entry to NSG. For Turkey, India's increasing economic and security profile is very important. India comes off as strong and powerful with its huge young and skilled population, a rich cultural base, and most importantly democratic institutions. India's research and development profile: space program, especially micro-satellite and nano-satellites program, research in generic drugs, scientific research institutions have all given India a confident industrial and development scenario. This is what has been the main force behind redefining India's strengthening relations with all major Muslim countries, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Egypt, almost unbound from any regional rivalry perceptions. India-Turkey cooperation in fields related to science, technology, education, culture and development areas have massive potential and both countries need each other to achieve their national interests and development goals.